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Abstract
Every day, people both make decisions and regret decisions. Whether it is second-guessing a major life choice
like one’s career or bemoaning the purchase of a particular shirt, the phenomenon of regret is familiar and
tangible. It is important to learn more about this psychological occurrence in order to help people avoid regret
by making better decisions in the future (Das & Kerr, 2010; Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2007). Learning about
regret necessitates both learning how the inherent mechanism of regret works, and also what external
circumstances affect the degree of the regret. Does being distracted on a cell phone while shopping at the
grocery store make you more or less regretful? Can other disturbances actually help you make more
satisfactory decisions? We hypothesize that the less attention an individual dedicates to a decision, the less
regret he or she will experience.
In this research paper we will explore the intersection of two large bodies of research on the topics of cognitive
load theory and decision regret and investigate whether individuals subject to a cognitive load during a
decision will subsequently experience more or less decision regret. Before discussing our experiment, though,
we will conduct an in-depth research analysis on each of these topics. This literature review will include a
general introduction to cognitive load theory and regret, various frameworks through which to understand
both topics, and some practical applications and implications for each body of research. We will then
synthesize the information and construct the hypothesis that an individual under a cognitive load will
experience less regret than an unrestrained individual. Following that, we will go through the mechanics of the
experiment and present the results of the data obtained. Lastly, we will discuss the results and develop some
conclusions.
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Introduction:
1
 
Every day, people both make decisions and regret decisions. Whether it is second-
guessing a major life choice like one’s career or bemoaning the purchase of a particular shirt, the 
phenomenon of regret is familiar and tangible. It is important to learn more about this 
psychological occurrence in order to help people avoid regret by making better decisions in the 
future (Das & Kerr, 2010; Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2007). Learning about regret necessitates both 
learning how the inherent mechanism of regret works, and also what external circumstances 
affect the degree of the regret. Does being distracted on a cell phone while shopping at the 
grocery store make you more or less regretful? Can other disturbances actually help you make 
more satisfactory decisions? We hypothesize that the less attention an individual dedicates to a 
decision, the less regret he or she will experience.  
In this research paper we will explore the intersection of two large bodies of research on 
the topics of cognitive load theory and decision regret and investigate whether individuals 
subject to a cognitive load during a decision will subsequently experience more or less decision 
regret. Before discussing our experiment, though, we will conduct an in-depth research analysis 
on each of these topics. This literature review will include a general introduction to cognitive 
load theory and regret, various frameworks through which to understand both topics, and some 
practical applications and implications for each body of research. We will then synthesize the 
information and construct the hypothesis that an individual under a cognitive load will 
experience less regret than an unrestrained individual. Following that, we will go through the 
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mechanics of the experiment and present the results of the data obtained. Lastly, we will discuss 
the results and develop some conclusions.  
Cognitive Load: 
 The first dimension of this study is based on existing literature discussing the various 
memory processes. There are three main stages of memory: the sensory memory, the working 
memory, and the long-term memory. Broadly speaking, the sensory memory deals with short-
lived incoming sensory inputs and the long-term memory holds dormant information for long 
periods of time (Schachter & Tulving, 1994). The working memory, which is the middle step in 
the process, is defined as “a brain system that provides temporary storage and manipulation of 
the information necessary for such complex cognitive tasks as language comprehension, 
learning, and reasoning“ (Baddeley, Logie, Bressi, Sala, & Spinnler, 1986). The working 
memory functions as a medium through which the sensory interactions with our surroundings are 
eventually encoded as long-term memories. Information must be processed through the 
bottleneck working memory.  
 The working memory has limited bandwidth with which to process information. Data 
processed in the working memory can be lost in less than 20 seconds (Peterson & Peterson, 
1959). Certain types of rehearsal can keep information in the working memory for longer than 
the 20 seconds and correlate to better long-term recall (Craik & Watkins, 1973), yet this exercise 
of the working memory requires effort that can come at the expense of other tasks (Salvucci & 
Beltowska, 2008). The scope of the working memory can also be extended using various sensory 
channels; Baddeley discusses how directing information through both visual and auditory stimuli 
can increase the total capacity of the working memory (Baddeley et al., 1986). In the field of 
4 
 
education, for example, teachers who want to increase their students’ retention should use 
various different modes of communication during instruction. 
 The reason students can struggle with processing information is because, as mentioned 
before, the working memory has a limited capacity. The amount of information that can be held 
in the working memory has been debated for decades. Groundbreaking research published in the 
book The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for 
Processing Information by George Miller argued that the average individual can remember 
approximately seven pieces of information, give or take two pieces (Miller, 1956). This result is 
also referred to as Miller’s law. He also famously noted that information is stored in chunks: 
hence the ability to remember seven words instead of just seven letters. The brain is able to use 
this chunking heuristic to remember more bits of information.  
 Ensuing research challenged Miller’s conception of the average size of an individual’s 
working memory. In 1974, Simon published an article claiming that the capacity of the human 
working memory is actually five to seven pieces of information (Simon, 1974), while Broadbent 
later argued that the capacity is only three chunks of information (Broadbent, 1975). Bettman 
and Hayes both asserted that one can process about six chunks (Bettman, 1979; Hayes, 1962) 
while Streufert mentions that the mind can retain ten separate chunks of information (Streufert, 
Suedfeld, & Driver, 1965). Malhotra analyzes the capacity by looking at how many disparate 
pieces of information can be processed at the same time, and determines that an average working 
memory can support forty five total comparisons across choices (Malhotra, 2014).  
 The discussions between these academics all operate within the vacuum of an unoccupied 
memory; they discuss how much potential internal capacity exists within the working memory. 
However, there are an unlimited number of distractions that can inhibit the potential capacity of 
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the mind. Listening to music has been shown by Salamé to place a strain on the working memory 
(Salamé & Baddeley, 1989), while Luethi discusses how external stress can also limit the 
working memory capacity (Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2008). Sleep deprivation also has been 
shown to impede working memory processing capacity (Chee & Choo, 2004; Mu et al., 2005).   
 Cognitive load theory emerged from the conception that it would be possible to positively 
affect people’s information processing capacities by consciously studying and manipulating 
external circumstances and variables. By extension, cognitive loads can also impact people’s 
capacities to learn and make decisions. There are two main types of cognitive loads: intrinsic 
loads, which are triggered by the nature of the task itself, and extraneous loads, which are caused 
by the instruction design (Schnotz & Kürschner, 2007). For example, an intrinsic load would be 
the complexity of a math question on an exam while the extraneous load would be the clarity of 
the question instructions. Before the 1990s, cognitive load theory “almost exclusively focused on 
instructional designs” in the education field (Schnotz & Kürschner, 2007, page 472), but more 
recently it has been applied to a broader range of fields. 
 Given the foundations of cognitive load theory explained above, the question remains 
regarding what precisely is the mechanism that makes cognitive loads work. There are many 
lenses through which to approach this topic, and we will briefly discuss how cognitive loads 
manifest in various decision strategies and in affect versus cognition.  
 Decision strategies can be divided into two main categories: similarity-based strategies 
and rule-based strategies (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; von 
Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). Similarity-based strategies superficially analyze a decision to fit 
it into an existing decision model, while rule-based strategies abstract a rule to make an 
informed, specific decision. Similarity-based strategies therefore draw on existing decision 
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frameworks, while rule-based strategies attempt to create a new particular framework. People 
tend to switch between these two frameworks depending on the situation (Juslin et al., 2008; von 
Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 2010).  
 In the local subject of cognitive loads, Hoffman, von Helversen and Rieskamp describe 
that individuals under a cognitive load were more likely to switch to use a similarity-based 
strategy while individuals not under a cognitive load would dedicate more working memory to a 
rule-based strategy (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013). Their experiments show that 
cognitive loads made subjects less effective at tasks well-suited for rule-based strategies while 
cognitive loads were helpful in situations well-suited for similarity-based strategies. These 
results are corroborated by other research showing that decision strategies that require a high 
amount of working memory are less effective, and even impaired, while under a cognitive load 
(Beilock & Decaro, 2007; J. W. Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, n.d.; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008). 
Thus, one mechanism through which cognitive loads have an effect is by crafting the decision 
strategy an individual uses in a given task. 
 Another framework useful in analyzing how cognitive loads work is affect and cognition 
during decision making. There are two large categories of decision processes of low-order affect 
and higher-order cognition. A similar dichotomy of two parallel systems of decision strategies 
with a rapid experiential process or a rational deliberate system is highlighted in Epstein’s 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (Epstein, 1993). Zajonc proposes that affect can circumvent 
cognitive processes to make quick decisions (Zajonc, 1980) while Hoch and Loewenstein discuss 
how impulses and desires can cause consumers to make purchase decisions mindlessly without 
rational deliberation (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991).  
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 Shiv and Fedorikhin researched the prevalence of these two main strategies under various 
degrees of cognitive load (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2014). They describe how automatic-affective 
processes are relied upon when under a cognitive load, while deliberate cognitive processes are 
relied upon when not under a cognitive load. Their experiment highlights this concept very 
clearly. First, they randomly assigned participants to either be subject to a cognitive load or not. 
After this random assignment, the participants were presented with both chocolate cake and fruit 
salad. The subjects not under a cognitive load relied on their deliberate cognitive processes and 
rationally decided to consumer the healthier fruit salad, while the subjects under a cognitive load 
relied more on their automatic-affective processes and decided to eat the ostensibly less healthy 
chocolate cake. Shiv and Fedorikhin frame this discussion as a struggle between the mind and 
the heart; given an appropriate amount of cognitive bandwidth, people can make positive rational 
decisions and not succumb to the temptations of the heart (or stomach).  
 Whether it works through the mechanism of shifting decision strategies from rule-based 
to similarity-based or by causing more affective decisions instead of cognitive decisions, 
cognitive loads have a wide-reaching effect on people’s actions. There are many situations in 
which cognitive loads seem to have a negative impact. Intuitively, Baddeley and Hitch discuss 
how cognitive loads severely impair the ability of one’s memory to recall information (Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974). As mentioned above, Shiv and Fedorikhin also showed that cognitive loads can 
cause individuals to make impulse purchases that the individual rationally should not purchase 
(Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2014).  
 Additionally, cognitive loads can have a deleterious impact on one’s ability to lie 
convincingly. Vrij discusses how the action of lying requires more working memory capacity 
than telling the truth because lying requires one to formulate the lie, actively control one’s own 
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body language to seem innocent, monitor the other party’s body language, and suppress the truth 
(Vrij et al., 2008). It is thus more cognitively demanding, and Vrij’s experiments show that 
people struggle to lie convincingly while under a cognitive load. Yogev-Seligmann shows that 
distractions that form a cognitive load can have negative effects on one’s motor abilities (Yogev-
Seligmann, Hausdorff, & Giladi, 2008) and Logie discusses how high cognitive loads can restrict 
one’s ability to solve arithmetic math problems (Logie, Gilhooly, & Wynn, 1994). These 
situations all are suited for rule-based decision strategies and deliberate, cognitive processes. 
 However, situations exist in which deliberation can be destructive, and operating under a 
cognitive load can actually improve one’s effectiveness at a task. Beilock observed individuals 
playing golf, and found that while the players’ performance improved while they under a 
cognitive load (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002). The players benefited from using a 
similarity-based strategy; by trusting their instincts, they were able to subconsciously use their 
muscle memory to improve their scores. Similarly, Beilock and Decaro constructed math 
questions for which answers were based on simple-strategies, and found that subjects identified 
the simple-strategy solutions more frequently while under a cognitive load (Beilock & Decaro, 
2007). 
 Individuals may also reap benefits from cognitive loads during emotionally-laced 
decisions (Drolet & Luce, 2004).  In emotional decisions, people are often forced to make 
tradeoffs on values while making a choice, and use heuristics in order to simplify the decision 
(Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997). A frequent heuristic is to avoid the choice with the less 
important personal value, despite the fact that it is overall a better choice. An example of this is 
when buying a car. Individuals may purchase a car with good safety ratings even while all of the 
other product attributes (gas mileage, sticker price etc) are poor. Once a cognitive load is 
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introduced, though, individuals tend to “fail to appreciate the implications of ego-relevant 
behaviors by diverting their attention away from self-goals” (Drolet & Luce, 2004, pages 63-64). 
Consumers under a cognitive load will not fall prey to these avoidance behaviors surrounding 
emotional decisions, and will actually be able to make a more rational decision. 
 Given these examples of cognitive loads impacting decisions or behaviors, how does 
being subject to a cognitive load impact someone’s level of decision regret? Is a rule-based 
strategy or a similarity-based strategy optimal for situations primed for regret? Similarly, is 
affect preferable to cognition in regret-prone decisions? In order to build a hypothesis 
surrounding these questions, it is first necessary to better understand the phenomenon of regret.  
Decision Regret: 
 A common trope in modern society equates freedom and happiness. Equal and unlimited 
opportunity is a central part of our culture, and the ability to make impactful decisions is viewed 
as a foundation of democracy. More concretely, though, there is also scientific evidence that 
shows choice is correlated with increases in intrinsic motivation, life satisfaction, perceived 
control and task performance (Langer & Rodin, 1976; Rotter, 1966; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Schulz 
& Hanusa, 1978; Taylor & Brown, 1988). However, this mantra of more choice paralleling more 
happiness recently has been disputed anecdotally and scientifically to show that more choice 
actually reduces happiness and increases regret (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000).  
 Decision regret has a number of potential benefits. In a broad evolutionary sense, regret 
serves as a helpful trigger to alert individuals when they have made a poor choice, and thus helps 
them refrain from making a similar mistake in the future (Zeelenberg, 1999). Regret can thus 
help project people on positive trajectories for growth and success by preventing future errors.  
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 Regret has also been found to improve assessments of post-choice valuation (Inman, 
Dyer, & Jia, 2014) and to have an inverse relationship with repurchase intent (Tsiros & Mittal, 
2000). Patrick, Lancellotti & Hagtvedt, notably, show that regret of an inaction can actually 
serve to increase repurchase intent, furthering the conception that regret can function as a 
corrective motivator (Patrick, Lancellotti, & Hagtvedt, 2009). The psychological phenomenon of 
regret works to retroactively clarify actions and prompt self-reflection to promote more 
successful future decisions. Understanding precisely why and in what situations people 
experience regret will help people channel their regret into more productive future actions 
(Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2007). 
 There are two main actions that lead to regret: acts of omission and acts of commission. 
Research by Gilovich asked individuals the question “When you look back on your life to this 
point, what are your biggest regrets?” Regrettable failures to act constituted 63% of the regrets 
mentioned (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). These acts of omission included familiar regrets of 
“missed educational opportunities,” “missed romantic opportunities,” and “not spending enough 
time with relatives.” Foregone opportunities remain salient in the mind of individuals, prompting 
them to take advantage of future situations to spend time with their family or seize career 
opportunities.  
 On the other hand, acts of commission can also yield considerable regret. Kahneman and 
Twersky (Kahneman & Twersky, 1982) asked subjects to respond to the following prompt: 
 “Mr. Paul owns shares in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
stock in company B, but he decided against it. He now finds out that he would have been 
better off by $1,200 if he had switched to the stock of company B. Mr. George owned 
shares in company B. During the past year he switched to stock in company A. He now 
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finds that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had kept his stock in company B. 
Who feels greater regret?”  
Predictably, 92% of respondents said that Mr. George is more regretful because he actively sold 
the shares in company B whereas Mr. Paul simply did not buy them. Other examples of acts of 
commission found by Gilovich (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995) include “I shouldn’t have smoked,” 
“I shouldn’t have married so early,” and “I shouldn’t have stressed work so much.” Both of these 
types of regret are causing the introspection and self-reflection mentioned by Zeelenberg above. 
 On a smaller scale, individuals and consumers also experience regret. Iyengar and Lepper 
conducted studies testing for regret in less consequential decisions like tasting chocolate or 
purchasing jam at a grocery store (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). In these situations, they found that 
consumers experience decision regret as well as decision paralysis, when the information 
overload between choices actually renders an individual unable to make a decision.  
 Various academics discuss different psychological stimulants of regret. One strand of 
researchers, including Bell and Loomes & Sugden, maintains that regret is driven by 
counterfactual thinking (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982). After a decision, an individual 
envisions all of the other options and says to him or herself that “I should have chosen the other, 
better option.” Personal accountability also plays a role in causing regret (Schwartz, 2004; 
Schwartz et al., 2002). Upon making a poor decision, individuals internalize the blame of the 
mistake and say “it was my fault that I made a bad decision.” By being involved in the decision 
process and appreciating the bad outcome of the process, individuals experience regret for their 
personal actions. Das and Kerr point out that both of these factors play a role in creating the 
regret, and discuss how analyzing the source of the regret can help individuals avoid 
experiencing it (Das & Kerr, 2010).  
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 The existence of regret substantiates other psychological frameworks as well. Kahneman 
and Miller describe how regret is a result of expectancy disconfirmation, and they note that 
negative disconfirmation elicits a stronger emotional response than positive disconfirmation 
(Kahneman, Miller, Griffin, Mcpherson, & Read, 1986). Additionally, Oliver shows that 
cognitive dissonance plays a role in amplifying regret (Oliver, 1997). 
 There are many extra-decisional factors that can affect the magnitude of decision regret. 
Barry Schwartz famously categorizes individuals into two types of buckets: maximizers and 
satisficers. According to Schwartz, maximizers are people that are focused on experiences or 
decisions always resulting in the absolute best outcome, whereas satisficers are focused on 
results being good enough (Schwartz, 2004). Under Schwartz’s framework, one’s personality 
type has a dramatic effect on the amount of regret one experiences. Maximizers tend to be 
unhappier and less satisfied with their choices for both of the reasons cited above: they easily 
construct counterfactuals about better outcomes and also heavily internalize any culpability for 
incorrect decisions. This leads them to be much more regretful than satisficers, who will be 
satisfied as long as the decision outcome is good enough.  
 Beyond the personality type of the individual, the choice situation itself can have 
dramatic implications on the extent of the regret. If a decision is made under time-stress, it can 
reduce the mind’s information processing capability and therefore encourage bad judgments 
(Ariely & Zakay, 2001). Urbany points out that decisions made under uncertainty can cause 
people to do more intense, albeit worse, analysis, and therefore might heighten the impact of the 
personal accountability cause of regret (Urbany, Dickson, & Wilkie, 1989).  
The size of the choice set can also directly impact the degree of the regret. Anderson 
explains that as the number of choices increase, the perceived differences between the various 
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choices diminish (Anderson, 2003). Thus, it becomes easier to construct post-facto 
counterfactuals that will increase decision regret. Schwartz similarly contends that more choices 
will equal more regret because the individual will have to turn down more options, thus 
increasing their personal responsibility for the incorrect decision (Schwartz et al., 2002). Payne 
argues that a larger choice set requires more effort to make a decision, and therefore makes the 
decision maker more vested in the decision outcome (J. Payne, 1992). Besides the size of the 
choice set, the structure of the choice set can also trigger feelings of regret. The placement of 
items within a set as well as the shared features of the item in the set can blend the differences 
between the various choices, and can thus trigger more counterfactual thinking after the purchase 
( Houston, Sherman, & Baker 1991; Zhang & Fitzsimons, 1999).  
 As mentioned above, regret is useful after the decision to prevent similar mistakes in the 
future. But research also shows that anticipated regret can actually affect a decision before it is 
made. More specifically, in some situations people will make a decision based on whether they 
think they will experience regret in the future because of their current dilemma. This 
phenomenon has been highlighted in numerous cases. Anticipated regret has been documented as 
having a significant impact in financial decisions (Barberis, Huang, & Thaler, 2006; Muermann, 
Mitchell, & Volkman, 2006) as well as insurance decisions (Braun & Muermann, 2004). 
Additionally, it has been shown to play a role in newsvendor models (Perakis & Roels, 2008) 
and, as one would intuitively expect, it considerably influences decisions made at auctions 
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 2008). 
Synthesis of Literature and Hypothesis: 
The hypothesis for our experiment was based on the research presented above on the two 
topics of cognitive loads and decision regret. The two causes of regret, counterfactual thinking 
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and personal accountability, are only relevant given a certain amount of memory capacity. The 
mind can only construct counterfactuals when it has enough working memory to process the 
other options. Similarly, individuals will only feel accountable for a decision when they have 
enough working memory to cogitate and feel invested in the decision. Without the fundamental 
capacity to effectively process a decision, the mind will use affect or similarity-based judgments 
and not be as vested in the outcome.  
One’s working memory capacity, as mentioned above, can be constrained both internally 
and externally and also varies across individual and situation. Internally, the strength of one’s 
memory in a vacuum is different for different individuals, as evidenced by the range given to 
Miller’s claim of seven chunks, plus or minus two (Miller, 1956). Similarly, there are countless 
forms of distractions, some of which were mentioned above, that can restrict individual’s 
immediate processing capacity. These distractions were shown to affect decision strategies and 
impact actual decisions, and that these distractions could impact levels of decision regret 
therefore is a real possibility. Ideally, given a more thorough understanding of the interaction, 
individuals can optimize their decision processes to minimize regret.  
 Our hypothesis is that if an individual has a limited working memory capacity during a 
decision, then he or she will experience less decision regret regarding the outcome of the 
decision. We propose this because we believe having less available working memory will lessen 
an individual’s personal accountability during the decision process and also restrict his or her 
ability to construct counterfactuals triggering regret.  
 In order to test this hypothesis, we constructed a study in the Wharton Behavioral Labs 
that would search for an interaction between these two factors. We modeled our study on Iyengar 
& Lepper’s chocolate experiment during which they tested for decision regret based on an 
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extensive-choice set and a limited-choice set (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). We then added an 
additional condition by randomly assigning half of the subjects a cognitive load to test for an 
interaction. In theory, we planned to replicate an existing regret experiment and then manipulate 
the results with an additional condition of a cognitive load. 
Method: 
 254 University of Pennsylvania students participated in the study: 64 participants in the 
extensive-choice no cognitive load condition, 64 participants in the limited-choice no cognitive 
load condition, 63 participants in the extensive-choice cognitive load condition and 63 
participants in the limited-choice cognitive load condition. To avoid any subject who didn’t like 
chocolate, and would therefore skew the results of the study, participants were prescreened with 
questions of “Do you like chocolate?” and “How often do you eat Godiva chocolates?” If the 
subject responded that they did not like chocolate, or that they frequently ate Godiva chocolate, 
they were excluded from the study for fear of their tastes altering their behavior. 87% of the 
subjects, or 221 total subjects, participated through the entire study.  
 The questions included in the questionnaire precisely mimicked the questions in Iyengar 
and Lepper’s study to gather similar data. All questions were answered using a 1-7 Likert scale. 
Participants were introduced to the study with an initial question that read “Please take a few 
moments to memorize the following number. You will be asked to recall this number later in the 
experiment, and will be compensated an additional $1 for a correct answer.” They were 
randomly assigned to memorize either an 8-digit number to memorize (13773478) or a 1-digit 
number (6). 
Participants were asked “How much did you enjoy making the choice?”, “Did you find it 
difficult to make your decision of which chocolate to pick?”, and “How frustrated did you feel 
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when making the choice?” to determine how the subjects perceived the choice-making process. 
They were also asked “How satisfied to do you think you will be if you sample this chocolate?” 
in order to see how satisfied the subjects predicted they would be if they were allowed to sample 
the chocolate. 
 The subjects were then asked “How confident are you that this chocolate will satisfy 
you?” and “How confident are you that this chocolate will be among the best you’ve ever had?” 
These two questions attempted to highlight the behaviors of the subjects as satisficers acting to 
seek any satisfactory option or maximizers acting to optimize the very best outcome. To test the 
perception of the subjects regarding the decision process and whether their decision was an 
accurate representation of how they would normally act, the subjects were asked “Do you feel 
that you made a well-informed decision on the chocolate you picked?” and “Is this a chocolate 
that you would normally pick?” 
 In addition to the questions regarding the process of choosing a chocolate, the subjects 
were also asked about their experience tasting the chocolate itself. They were asked about their 
satisfaction with the chocolate, regrets about the chocolate, and their satisfaction with the 
number of choices presented to them. The survey included questions of “How satisfied were you 
with the chocolate you tasted?”, “How much did you enjoy the sample you tasted?”, and “How 
tasty was the chocolate you sampled?” Additionally, the subjects were asked “How much do you 
regret eating the chocolate you tasted?” and “Do you think that there were chocolates on the 
table that tasted much better?” Lastly, subjects were asked “When initially given the task to pick 
a chocolate from the display, do you think the selection should have included more kinds of 
chocolates?” 
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Procedure: 
 The study was conducted in a laboratory setting at the Wharton Behavioral Labs. 
Participants entered the lab and were seated at a personal cubicle. They were then introduced to 
the experiment as a study about memory strength and consumer choices and asked to memorize 
either an 8-digit number (13773478) for the cognitive load condition or a 1-digit number (6) for 
the no cognitive load condition. They were informed that they would be asked to recall the 
number later in the survey, and would be given an extra $1 if they remembered it correctly.  
The participants were then shown the following vignette: “We're doing a marketing 
research study that examines how people select chocolates. Please raise your hand to signal the 
attendant to come over. Please take a look at the names of the chocolates and the chocolates 
themselves, and tell the attendant which one you would buy for yourself.” The participants 
selected their chocolate from a table in the lab room. In the limited-choice condition, the 6 
flavors of chocolate were set up in three rows of two types of chocolate, whereas in the 
extensive-choice condition the 18 flavors of chocolate were set up in three rows of six types of 
chocolate. In the limited-choice condition, the chocolates were rotated such that all flavors of 
chocolate in the extensive-choice condition also appeared in the limited-choice condition. 
After the participants selected the chocolate they would theoretically taste, they completed 
the questions about the decision process and about their anticipated satisfaction from the 
chocolate. The participants were then given the chocolate they selected to taste, and answered the 
remaining questions on the questionnaire about their actual satisfaction with the chocolate. 
Lastly, the participants were relieved of their cognitive load and were asked to report the number 
they memorized at the beginning of the study. 
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Results: 
The number of choices did have an effect on participants’ perceptions of the study. 
Participants in the extensive-choice conditions said that they had “too many” choices (M=4.90, 
SD=1.28) while participants in the limited-choice conditions said that the number of choices was 
“about right” (M=3.78, SD=1.14). This confirms that the individuals still felt overloaded despite 
only being presented with 18 options in the extensive-choice condition (unlike the 30 used in 
Iyengar and Lepper’s study). The cognitive load had no significant effect on these perceptions 
within the choice-condition.  
Similar to Iyengar and Lepper’s study, the results showed that all participants were more 
confident that their chocolate would be satisfactory to them (M=5.81, SD=1.05) than that their 
chocolate selection would be among the best they had ever had (M=3.84, SD=1.60), F(1, 
440)=234.83, p<.0001. Thus, the data does not show that the cognitive load or the choice-
conditions promoted maximizing or satisficing behavior.  
There were no significant differences between conditions about the level of anticipated 
satisfaction of the choice of chocolate. Similarly, there were no significant reported differences 
between conditions regarding how well-informed participants felt or whether this was a 
chocolate they would normally pick. 
Participants in the extensive-choice condition (M=5.56, SD=1.17) actually enjoyed the 
decision process significantly more than those in the limited-choice condition (M=4.82, 
SD=1.19), F(1, 222)=30.17, p<.0001, consistent with Iyengar and Lepper’s findings. Similarly, 
subjects in the extensive-choice condition also found the process more difficult (M=4.35, 
SD=1.81), (M=2.91, 1.72), F(1, 219)=35.02, p<.0001. Unlike Iyengar and Lepper’s results, 
though, participants in this study did not find the extensive-choice condition significantly more 
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frustrating (M=2.26, SD=1.52), (M=1.74, S=1.32), F(1, 219)=3.55, p= .06, ns.  In each of these 
tests, the cognitive load did not have a significant impact on the participants’ reports.  
To determine the satisfaction and regret levels of the participants across all four 
conditions, we created one composite measure of satisfaction. This was done by averaging the 
responses to the questions regarding tastiness, enjoyment and satisfaction (r= .90, .92 and .93) 
post-sampling along with the responses to the two questions regarding regret (r=.33, which were 
coded negatively). We then conducted ANOVA statistical tests across conditions, but found no 
significant differences across the cognitive load conditions or even across the extensive and 
limited-choice conditions. 
The lack of results in support of the hypothesis can be thought about in a few ways. On 
the one hand, the results may simply show that there isn’t a significant interaction between 
cognitive loads and decision regret, despite the research cited above that would seem to support 
the hypothesis. On the other hand, perhaps there was a flaw in the experiment that made the 
results insignificant.  
The experiment did not trigger regret in significantly different degrees across the 
extensive-choice conditions and limited-choice conditions as it had in Iyengar and Lepper’s 
original study. The cognitive load was therefore irrelevant because the base experiment was 
unsuccessful in eliciting testable results in the first place. This could be a flaw in experiment 
design, as slight modifications were made to the experiment. For example, in Iyengar and 
Lepper’s study the subjects were led through a series of rooms at each stage in the experiment, 
while in this study they were seated at a cubicle for the majority of the study. Additionally, in 
Iyengar and Lepper’s study the chocolates were presented in one row of six or five rows of six, 
while in this study the chocolates were presented in three rows of two or three rows of six.  
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Across all of the questions, the cognitive load did not have a significant impact in and of 
itself across the two extensive-choice conditions or across the two limited-choice conditions. 
This absence was particularly apparent in the final regret analysis that directly related to our 
hypothesis, but that might have been a function of the failure of the underlying experiment and 
not evidence in support of the null hypothesis. Further research is required to properly determine 
the extent of the interaction between cognitive loads and decision regret.  
Discussion and Conclusion: 
 This study analyzed the existing literature on two major fields in psychology: cognitive 
load theory and decision regret. Cognitive load theory attempts to manipulate people’s working 
memory capacity to perform better at particular tasks. People are often distracted or overworked, 
and by understanding how these cognitive loads function in relation to people’s decision 
processes and learning abilities we can improve and optimize those situations. Scholars differ as 
to the internal capacity of the working memory, but all agree that there is a range of internal 
capacities alongside a host of external restrictions on total working memory ability.  
The mechanism of a cognitive load can be thought about in two different ways. The first 
way cognitive loads are impactful is by shifting the mind from a rule-based decision strategy to a 
similarity-based strategy, which can be helpful for mindless tasks like playing golf but hurtful for 
complex tasks like driving. Another way cognitive loads are impactful is by promoting more 
affective and impulsive decision making over cognitive and deliberative decision making. This 
was tangibly portrayed in the experiment of the fruit salad and chocolate cake. In either 
framework, the cognitive load restricts the processing capacity of the mind and furthers 
heuristics as the best available decision strategy. 
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 At the same time, the literature surrounding decision regret is extensive as well. Regret 
serves an important role by forcing individuals to reflect on previous mistakes and learn not to 
repeat them. Regret can be triggered by both acts of omission and acts of commission, on both a 
large scale regarding life decisions and also a small scale regarding individual consumer 
purchases. The feeling of regret is triggered by both a sense of personal accountability for a 
poorly made decision and the ability to recall better potential outcome counterfactuals. Regret 
can be magnified based on time urgency, emotional situations, or the nature of the choice set.  
 The question we investigated in our experiment was regarding the extent of the 
intersection between these two fields of study. Cognitive loads have been documented to impact 
decision processes (by switching to similarity-based or affective judgments). How would a 
cognitive load impact an individual’s decision regret levels? We hypothesized that because a 
cognitive load would distract an individual, he or she would not feel as vested in the decision and 
thus would not feel as personally accountable or, by extension, as regretful. Similarly, we 
proposed that because the individual’s working memory was constrained, he or she would not be 
able to as easily construct counterfactuals and therefore also be less regretful. 
 We tested this hypothesis by modifying an existing experiment done by Iyengar and 
Lepper that tested decision regret and adding a condition of a cognitive load. The experiment 
failed to show any significant correlation between the cognitive load and other variables in the 
experiment, including the anticipated satisfaction, the enjoyment of the decision process, and the 
frustration with the process of the participants. More importantly, though, the experiment failed 
to show any significant correlation between the cognitive load and levels of decision regret. This 
could simply be a result of there being no interaction, but underlying the data it became clear that 
the experiment itself failed to trigger the appropriate discrepancies even while ignoring the 
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cognitive load condition. The difference in regret between the extensive-choice condition and the 
limited-choice condition was insignificant, unlike Iyengar and Lepper’s results. Given that 
platform, the cognitive load test was not able to prove any sort of interaction or absence thereof.  
Given the demonstrated impact of cognitive loads on abstract decision strategies, we still 
believe intuitively that there is some connection between the two phenomena. Further research is 
needed to determine the extent of this connection and to determine the accuracy of the 
hypothesis presented above. Critical to the success of said research is a baseline experiment that 
triggers discernible regret across conditions.  
 We presented the sentiment that consumers equate freedom with happiness, and that 
recent research has served to debunk this myth by showing psychologically how more choices 
can create more decision regret. On a philosophical note, this idea of the tyranny of freedom is 
echoed by Isaiah Berlin (Berlin, 1958). In his work Two Concepts of Liberty, he discusses the 
difference between positive and negative liberty: positive liberty (or positive freedom) is the 
ability to choose what one wishes according to one’s capabilities, while negative liberty (or 
negative freedom) is the autonomy to choose what one wishes free of external constraints.  The 
idea that freedom equals happiness is assuming a particular type of freedom; specifically, it is 
assuming negative freedom from any constraints. This manifests itself in unlimited options in 
any decision, but also, as we have seen, in higher levels of decision regret. Perhaps by promoting 
a broader definition of freedom as positive liberty, individuals will recognize that true freedom 
lies in our ability to choose, not in the external limits set on our choices. Limits are not inherently 
bad, and can actually serve a real function by reducing our decision regret. By shifting our focus 
to a positive definition of freedom and choice we can create a more satisfied culture and society.  
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